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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
浅析非法行医
北安市人民法院—崔文茂
　　未取得医生执业资格的人，非法行医，情节严重的行为构成非法行医罪。该罪名是修订后《刑法》新增加的罪名。医疗行业是一种专业性很强的行业，医生肩负着治病救人、救死扶伤的重大责任。因此，国家对医生从业规定了严格的执业审批制度。不具备这种资格的人就不能行医。本文试从法律规定、认定和与医疗事故罪的区别来分析该罪。
　　一、非法行医罪的概念
　　非法行医罪，是指未取得医生执业资格的人，非法行医，情节严重的行为。非法行医情节严重主要是指非法行医时间长，因非法行医被取缔后又非法行医的；延误病人及时治疗的；没有基本的医疗知识而冒充医生为他人进行诊疗；其医疗条件严重不符合国家规定的医疗机构基本标准的；没有取得医生执业资格非法行医不听有关部门劝阻的，伪造、涂改《医疗机构执业许可证》进行非法行医的；违反有关法律、法规和医疗技术规范，在医疗过程中对就医者有其他违法行为的；使用非医疗技术人员从事医疗卫生技术工作的；自定收费标准，乱开药方，牟取的非法利益数额较大的；向病人出售少量假冒伪劣药品，违法规定超计量贩卖国家明令控制的麻醉药品、医疗用毒性药品、精神药品和放射性药品的；使用未经批准使用的药品、消毒药剂和医疗器械的；在医疗工作中作风恶劣，不负责任，发生医疗事故的；非法行医使多人身体受到损害，影响恶劣的；因非法行医造成就诊人身体健康受到严重损害，甚至致人身体严重残疾或者死亡的等等。
　　关于非法行医罪的主体问题目前有两种不同看法，一种认为本罪是特殊主体犯罪，另一种认为本罪是一般主体犯罪，但有一点是明确的，只能是未取得医生执业资格的人才能成为非法行医犯罪的主体。既可以是中国人，也可以是外国人。主要包括以下几种情况：（1）不具备医疗技术、医疗知识的普通自然人；（2）具备医疗技术，但尚未取得合法行医资格的人；（3）具备行医资格，却不具备从事特点医疗业务的人。这部分人主要有：（1）刑法及相关行政法规颁布之前领有执照后未验证的开业医生；（2）过去被精简下来的，以及过去因故被开除或刑满释放，现在闲在社会上的医务人员；（3）这些年社会上出现的一些自称祖传中医或专治某些疾病的人，以及部分业余医药爱好者；（4）近年来退休的医生。本罪侵犯的客体是国家对医疗机构以及医务从业人员的管理秩序，及公民的生命和健康权利。犯非法行医罪主观方面只能是故意犯罪，及明知自己没有取得医生执业资格而从事医生职业。犯罪的客观方面表现为非法行医，即未取得医生执业资格的人，非法从事诊断、诊疗、医务护理等医务工作，属于一种职业犯和营业犯。通常以作为的方式实施，同时还需具备严重的情节。法行医行为人的行为表现主要有：1、自己挂牌诊疗或在药店坐堂，2、挂靠于某些组织机构开业行医，3、在集市街道上摆摊看病、流动行医。
　　二、关于非法行医方面的法律规定
　　1．《中华人民共和国刑法》第三百三十六条“未取得医生执业资格的人非法行医，情节严重的，处三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制，并处或者单处罚金；严重损害就诊人身体健康的，处三年以上十年以下有期徒刑，并处罚金，造成就诊人死亡的，处十年以上有期徒刑，并处罚金。”2．《中华人民共和国执业医师法》第三十九条“未经批准擅自开办医疗机构行医或者非医师行医的，由县级以上人民政府卫生行政部门予以取缔，没收其违法所得及其药品、器械，并处十万元以下的罚款；对医师吊销其执业证书；给患者造成损害的，依法承担赔偿责任；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。”3．《医疗机构管理条例》第十五条“医疗机构执业，必须进行登记，领取《医疗机构执业许可证》。”第二十四条“任何单位或者个人，未取得《医疗机构执业许可证》，不得开展诊疗活动。”第二十七条“医疗机构必须按照核准登记的诊疗科目开展诊疗活动。”第二十八条“医疗机构不得使用非卫生技术人员从事医疗卫生技术工作。”
　　三、产生非法行医的原因
　　现实生活中，非法行医的现象仍然普遍存在，甚至有愈演愈烈的趋势，并且不易被行政执法部门、刑事执法部门发现。待发觉时又大多造成了就诊人员伤残、死亡等严重后果。探求这一现象得以滋生蔓延的原因主要表现为：（1）大、中型医院的诊疗费、治疗费、医药费、护理费普遍偏高，为广大人民群众特别是城市普通居民、偏远落后地区的农民的经济收入所难以承受；（2）距城镇较远的乡村、山寨仍处于缺医少药的状况；（3）群众的普遍文化水准偏低，讳疾忌医、贪图便宜、病急乱投医甚至愚昧迷信的情况随处可见；（4）一些疑难杂症尚未为现今医疗技术所攻克；（5）部分从业医生医德较差，在群众中造成不良影响；（6）就医者由于自己行为的不合法如超计划生育怀孕等而不愿就诊于合法医院；（7）医疗、医药行业丰厚的利润令一些不法之徒趋之若桀；（8）偏方医大病、名医在民间的陈腐思想根深蒂固；（9）主管部门管理不到位。从历史原因来看，中医学有着悠久的历史，而且中医治疗疾病的方法非常丰富，包括方（汤）药、针灸、推拿、气功、刮痧、火罐、水疗、割治等方法，并形成了针灸学、中医方剂学、中药学等学科探寻针灸的历史可追溯至1万年以前的旧石器时代。战国时期著名的医学家扁鹊、东汉末年著名医学家华佗、明代著名中医药大师李时珍他们游历于民间行医采药而集医学大成的事迹可谓是家喻户晓，并为后人所盲目效仿；从《黄帝内经》、《神农本草》、《本草纲目》等祖国医药典籍不难发觉中医用药的庞杂和随手可得，用药讲究“阴阳相补、五行通络、以精养气”，大讲“病来如山倒、病去似抽丝”，为一部分庸医、游医、江湖骗子提供了可乘之机；清政府、北洋军阀和国民党政府均曾经以政府的行政手段对中医特别是针灸疗法予以废止，令一部分坐堂中医隐居于山林、栖身于草莽。1840年鸦片战争爆发以后，西方帝国主义列强在军事、政治入侵的同时也进行了文化医学方面的侵略。他们在开办医院、医学学校的基础上，委派了大量传教士到祖国各地进行西方文化的传播，从事西方医学的宣传、诊疗活动。凡此种种历史原因，铸就了非法行医这一社会现象。
　　四、非法行医罪与医疗事故罪的区别
　　非法行医罪与医疗事故罪都表现为违反相应的行政法规，并且都有可能造成病人死亡或严重损害其健康，但两罪有着本质的区别。（1）非法行医罪的主体为未取得医生执业资格的人，而医疗事故罪的主体却必须是国家主管部门批准从事医生职业的医务工作人员；（2）非法行医行为人主观方面表现为一种故意犯罪，而医疗事故行为人的主观方面则是表现为过失。（3）犯罪客观方面表现不同，非法行医犯罪属于情节犯，根据法律规定，情节严重是构成本罪的条件，但不一定造成就诊人的身体伤害或者死亡，而医疗事故罪则属于实害犯，造成就诊病人死亡或者严重损害就诊人身体健康是构成医疗事故犯罪的必备要件。非法行医罪与非法进行节育手术罪的区别，广泛意义上讲，非法行医罪的本身内涵就包括非法进行节育手术罪，刑法之所以在非法行医罪之外又设立非法进行节育手术罪，将破坏节育行为从非法行医行为中独立开来，是为了突出刑法对国家计划生育政策执行的特殊保护。
　　五、行为与危害结果的因果关系判断
《刑法》第336条第1款规定了三个量刑幅度标准，法条原文分别以“情节严重”、“严重损害就诊人身体健康”、“造成就诊人死亡”作为决定量刑幅度的前提要件。司法实践中，如何认识非法行医人对就诊人身体伤害、死亡结果的发生在主观方面的态度有两种不同看法：一种观点认为，非法行医罪的主观方面是故意犯罪，只有在故意犯罪情况下才能对“严重损害就诊人身体健康、造成就诊人死亡”的后果承担相应的法律罪责，否则这种后果的发生只能以非法行医情节严重视之，另一种观点则认为，非法行医罪的主观方面不存在过失，因为刑法只考察行为人的主观方面的故意或过失，主要依据他对其危害行为侵犯的客体所持的心理态度，对于危害后果的心理态度仅是辅助因素。非法行医行为人是在明知自己的行为不符合国家对医疗卫生秩序的管理规定，为了一己私利，而一意孤行的故意犯罪行为。笔者认为应该从结果加重犯的角度来理解非法行医行为与结果之间的因果关系。所谓结果加重犯又叫加重结果犯，是指法律上规定的一个犯罪行为，由于发生了严重结果而加重其法定刑的情况，结果加重犯的成立条件是：
（1）行为人必须实施了基本犯罪行为，且对于犯罪行为造成的加重结果没有故意；例如，某甲没有取得医师执业资格的情况下，开设门诊从事诊疗活动已10年之久，2001年10月份的一天，某甲在为某乙接生时，盲目使用催产素，导致产妇宫腔压力异常增大，羊水进入破裂血管，形成羊水栓塞、急性心肺功能衰竭死亡，胎儿宫内窘迫死亡。该案中某甲实施了非法行医的基本犯罪行为，长期从事非法行医诊疗活动，这是构成非法行医犯罪的前提条件，也是构成结果加重犯的前提条件。
（2）基本犯罪行为造成了加重后果，基本犯罪与加重后果之间存在因果关系；所谓加重结果是指法律规定超出基本犯罪的罪责范围的结果。就该案而言，某乙的死亡就是加重结果，因为某乙的死亡已经超出了某甲非法行医的犯罪故意，同时又是某甲非法行医行为所导致引发，与某甲的非法行医行为有着必然的因果关系。刑法之所以要追究犯罪行为人对超出基本犯罪故意的加重结果的刑事责任，就是因为基本行为与加重结果之间存在因果关系。追究刑事责任不能脱离因果关系，抛开因果关系去办案，就可能发生主观归罪的偏颇。假如该案中某乙在家自行生产因为大出血、昏迷后被送至某甲处抢救无效死亡，且某乙的死亡与某甲的行为没有直接的因果关系，则某甲对某乙的死亡结果就不应承担刑事责任。
（3）非法行医行为人对于加重结果主观上有罪过，也就是说非法行医行为人对造成就诊人身体的伤害、死亡的加重后果发生可能预见。如果说基本犯罪与加重结果之间存在因果关系是非法行医行为人对加重结果承担刑事责任的客观基础，那么，非法行医行为人主观上的罪过便是其对加重结果承担刑事责任的主观基础。仍以该案为例，假如某乙在某甲处顺产一男婴，生产当时母子平安，当某乙得知是久盼的男孩后，极度兴奋情况下，引发心肌梗塞死亡。如此，则死亡结果便为某甲所不能预见，某甲的主观上没有罪过，自然也就不应对此结果承担法律责任。